Ambiguity, logic, simplicity, and dynamics: Wittgensteinian evaluative criteria in peer review of quantitative research on categorization.
Research on categorization has changed over time, and some of these changes resemble how Wittgenstein's views changed from his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus to his Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein initially focused on unambiguous, abstract, parsimonious, logical propositions and rules, and on independent, static, "atomic facts." This approach subsequently influenced the development of logical positivism and thereby may have indirectly influenced method and theory in research on categorization: much animal research on categorization has focused on learning simple, static, logical rules unambiguously interrelating small numbers of independent features. He later rejected logical simplicity and rigor and focused instead on Gestalt ideas about figure-ground reversals and context, the ambiguity of family resemblance, and the function of details of everyday language. Contemporary contextualism has been influenced by this latter position, some features of which appear in contemporary empirical research on categorization. These developmental changes are illustrated by research on avian local and global levels of visual perceptual analysis, categorization of rectangles and moving objects, and artificial grammar learning. Implications are described for peer review of quantitative theory in which ambiguity, logical rigor, simplicity, or dynamics are designed to play important roles.